Reconceptualizing hegemony: the circle of hydro-hegemony by Menga, Filippo
Reconceptualizing hegemony: the circle of  
hydro­hegemony 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Menga, F. (2016) Reconceptualizing hegemony: the circle of 
hydro­hegemony. Water Policy, 18 (2). pp. 401­418. ISSN 
1366­7017 doi: https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2015.063 Available 
at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/72319/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
Published version at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2166/wp.2015.063 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2166/wp.2015.063 
Publisher: IWA Publising 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Reconceptualising Hegemony: The Circle of Hydro-Hegemony 
Filippo Menga, University of Manchester 
filippo.menga@manchester.ac.uk 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by IWA Publishing in Water Policy, 
Volume 18, Issue 2, pages 401-418, available online: http://wp.iwaponline.com/content/18/2/401  
[Article DOI: 10.2166/wp.2015.063]. 
 
 
 
If you beat your head against the wall, it is your head that breaks and not the wall. 
Antonio Gramsci, Letters from Prison, 1930 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper proposes a partial reconceptualization and a redesign of the Framework of Hydro-
Hegemony (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Cascao & Zeitoun, 2010), an analytical tool devised to study 
how power, hegemony, and power asymmetries can influence transboundary water politics. This is 
done by presenting the original Circle of Hydro-Hegemony (CHH), an analytical framework that 
places the neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony at the centre of its structure, to illustrate how various 
forms of power are connective in the function of hegemony. Following a theoretical discussion on 
how the concepts of power and hegemony can interact, the case of the Aral Sea basin in Central 
Asia will provide a practical application of the CHH to transboundary water politics.  
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1. Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to propose a partial reconceptualization of the Framework of Hydro-
Hegemony (hereinafter FHH) (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Cascao & Zeitoun, 2010), an analytical 
framework devised to study how power, hegemony, and power asymmetries can influence 
transboundary water politics. Since its appearance in 2006, the FHH has informed a vast body of 
literature addressing the role of power and discourse in hydropolitics (see, among others, Water 
Policy, 2008; Daoudy, 2009; Dinar, 2009; Zeitoun, Eid-Sabbagh, Talhami, & Dajani, 2013; Zeitoun 
& Mirumachi, 2008; Zeitoun, Mirumachi, & Warner, 2011), thus contributing to expand the water 
discourse to a more critical perspective. As Warner and Zeitoun (2008: 803) argued, International 
Relations (IR) theory and transboundary water interactions can be usefully combined to better 
understand political processes and power relations in international river basin, and to avoid the 
traditional “water wars” and “water peace” discourses. 
Yet, while the concepts and analytical tools proposed by the FHH have proved valuable to 
analyse the discursive constructions and the invisible forces that can influence international water 
relations, I argue that a more in-depth theoretical discussion is needed to appreciate how the 
concepts of power and hegemony can interact. A different and more nuanced understanding of their 
relationship can open the way to a new analytical approach to studying power in hydropolitics, one 
in which the various forms of power are connective in the function of hegemony. Furthermore, the 
current structure of the FHH seems to favour power over hegemony, and this does not appropriately 
represent the intimate connection between these two concepts. Throughout this paper I will 
therefore propose a redesign of the structure of hydro-hegemony, the Circle of Hydro-Hegemony 
(hereinafter CHH), an analytical framework that explicitly shows that the neo-Gramscian notion of 
hegemony and not power is at the centre of its structure.  
The rest of this paper is divided into five sections. The next two sections provide theoretical 
insights into the notions of power and hegemony in social sciences, to then explain how these two 
concepts are intimately connected, and to subsequently illustrate the subjects of power and 
hegemony in water relations and the FHH. The fourth section presents the CHH, outlining its 
rationale and analytical insights, while in the fifth section the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia serves 
as a platform to illustrate how the CHH can be used to analyse transboundary water politics. The 
final section concludes, discussing the limitations of this study as well as the implication of the 
findings to future research in the field of critical hydropolitics. 
 
2. Power 
In this section I will attempt to define power, keeping in mind, however, that this is an essentially 
contested concept in politics, one that can be given different interpretations and meanings 
(Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007; Lukes, 1974), and its appropriate definition remains a 
controversial matter (Waltz, 1986). The first modern analysis of political power can be traced back 
to the work of Machiavelli (1958), who argued that power is not to be considered as a means to an 
end but as the end itself, and described how it can be acquired, retained and expanded. A competing 
analysis was that of Hobbes (1995), according to whom power is linked to sovereignty and consent. 
For him, state power originates from a contract through which people voluntarily confer their power 
to a man or to an assembly, which will guarantee peace and stability.  
The end of the Second World War and the progress of political science brought an increasing 
interest to the study of power in the social sciences. In particular, Max Weber’s Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization (Weber & Parsons, 1947) had a strong impact on future theorisations 
on power. According to Weber, power is the capacity of one actor to realize its will in a social 
relationship, despite the opposition of other actors. The concept of power is therefore associated to 
that of domination. In Weber’s view, political power is not based on social and economic factors 
but on three different sources of legitimation: charismatic authority (of a particular leader or of a 
certain institution, as in the case of dictatorial regimes during the last century); traditional authority 
(based on tradition and longevity, typical of pre-modern societies); and rational-legal authority 
(typical of modern societies and based on the belief that rationally established rules are legal). 
Following up on Weber’s ideas, Robert Dahl, who implicitly considered power as a relation among 
people from a behavioural science perspective, defined it as the ability of A “to get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957: 203).  
 
2.1. Three dimensions of power 
Bacharach and Baratz (1962) further expanded the concept of power and developed a new 
theoretical model to include “what does not happen” in decision-making processes. The first face of 
power, or overt, is related with Dahl’s idea of A imposing its will to B, and is directly observable in 
the decision-making process, where a group makes decisions that directly affect another group
1
. 
The second face of power, instead, involves the dynamics of the non-decision-making process, and 
resides in the ability to create and reinforce “barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts” 
(Bacharach & Baratz, 1962: 948), or to use influence to limit the breadth of a discussion and to 
avoid conflicts from even being brought up to the political forum. Just because something did not 
happen, it doesn’t mean that nothing happened.  
Using as a starting point the work carried out by Dahl and by Bacharach and Baratz, Steven 
Lukes (1974, 2005b) further developed the study of power, finding its two-dimensional view 
inadequate, as it relies on the supposition that power – when associated with conflict – can actually 
be observed. Moreover, previous interpretations of power did not consider the ability of an actor to 
influence the norms and values accepted by others. For instance, “A may exercise power over B by 
getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, 
shaping or determining his very wants” (Lukes, 1974: 23). Since power can be hidden and not 
always visible, Lukes ideated a theoretical framework with three dimensions of power. The first, 
overt or hard dimension of power, is similar to Dahl’s idea of power, and it is represented by the 
material capacity of A having B doing something against his will. The second dimension of power 
                                                     
1
 This is also in line with the influential work carried out by Harold Lasswell in Politics: Who Gets What, When, How 
(1936), in which power was seen as the ability to influence other people and to participate in the decision-making 
process. 
is less visible, covert, and refers to Bacharach and Baratz’s second face of power: it is the ability to 
control the political agenda and to create barriers that would impede certain issues to be discussed. 
But Lukes’ original contribution to this debate stems from the idea of a third dimension of power, 
which he considers as the most effective among the three. This third dimension, power through 
domination, is hidden and goes beyond the domains of decision-making and setting of the political 
agenda, to encompass the area in which the preferences and perceptions of others are formed and 
shaped. As Lukes observes, “is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have 
the desires you want them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts 
and desires?” (Lukes, 1974: 23). This ideological dimension of power, which can be defined as 
power over ideas or ideational, draws on the Gramscian concept of hegemony to explain how the 
powerful secures the willing compliance of those they dominate (Lukes, 2005a).  
Lukes (2005b) subsequently delved on the work of Michel Foucault to further expand his power 
analysis. Foucault’s vision of domination framed in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1979) is seen 
by Lukes as helpful in understanding how domination can be secured through acquiescence, as well 
as Foucault’s ideas on the link between power and knowledge and on power as a productive force. 
In the History of Sexuality (1998), Foucault introduced the popular concept of power/knowledge, to 
explain how power is formed by accepted forms of knowledge and truths. Power is ubiquitous, and 
it cannot be wielded but it is rather part of discourses. Power must be understood as the multiplicity 
of force relations within the context in which it operates. According to Foucault, “Power is 
everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere [...] power 
is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the 
name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault, 1998: 
93). 
As a result, Lukes finally defined the power of an actor as “his ability to avoid or resist 
performing positive actions” (Lukes, 2005b: 480), bringing the example of how the US under the 
Bush Administration showed its power by not performing certain actions, such as ratifying the 
Kyoto protocols or joining the International Criminal Court. In relation with the work of Lukes and 
Foucault, and therefore with the connection between knowledge, ideas and power, it is worth noting 
that also Susan Strange (1994) recognised the existence of a third dimension of power, which 
originates in the “knowledge structure”. This third level of power, is the level at which power is 
exercised by the strong over the weak in the realm of ideas, to the extent that the weak “believe that 
the value-judgments of the strong really are the universally right and true ones” (Strange, 1994: 
176). In her study of power relations in the field of finance, Strange made an interesting distinction 
between structural power and relational power. She noted how in the post-war period, the United 
States used their structural power to extend or restrict the range of options open to others (Strange, 
1990), while Japan used its relational power stemming from its global position as a major creditor 
and aid donor. If, on the one hand, relational power is clearly seen by Strange as “the ability of A to 
get B by coercion or persuasion to do what B would not otherwise do” (Strange, 1989: 145), on the 
other hand, the definition of structural power is less straightforward. Structural power, which has 
four dimensions – security, production, finance and knowledge – is eventually defined as “the 
power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate 
to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises” (Strange, 1998: 25). 
 Thus, if structural power is interpreted as the ability to shape and influence relational 
frameworks, it is clear its connections with Lukes’ ideational power and with the Gramscian notion 
of hegemony. Along the same line, Gill and Law (1988) drew from the work of Lukes to also 
identify three dimensions of power. While the first two dimensions (open or overt and covert) are 
similar to those observed in this analysis, it is with the third, structural power – which derives from 
Lukes’ third dimension – that they brought a fresh contribution to the debate. According to Gill and 
Law, structural power is the “definite attraction and limitation systems with the physical and 
normative aspects to shape the relations of parties” (Gill & Law, 1988: 74). This dimension of 
power encompasses both material and normative aspects that work together in the creation of a 
system of incentives and constraints. 
2.2. From hard to soft power 
What emerges from this overview is that power is not a single entity but it represents a variety of 
concepts and ideas. One aspect nevertheless appears clear. As Clegg and Haugaard noted, “power 
as domination, which is linked to (the capacity for) violent agency, is the dominant perception of 
power in everyday speech […]. However, if we look to the academic social science literature, 
increasingly the conception of power as essentially grounded in coercion represents a minority 
view” (Clegg & Haugaard, 2009: 3). The focus has thus moved from “hard” to “soft” power, the 
first being visible and concrete, and the latter being hidden and more sophisticated. On the one 
hand, hard power corresponds to Dahl’s definition of power, or to Lukes’ first dimension, and is the 
ability to coerce, which derives from a country’s military, economic and technological might and, 
especially in hydropolitics, from a country’s geographical position, (i.e. being upstream or 
downstream). On the other hand, soft power, as it was originally defined by Joseph Nye, “[i]s the 
ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2004: 256). 
A few years later, Nye added to his analysis a new form of power, “smart power”, which he defined 
as “the ability to combine hard and soft power into a successful strategy” (Nye, 2009).  
Nye’s concept of soft power can here be adapted and used to represent the second and third 
dimensions of power as they were analysed previously, as it proves efficient in encapsulating power 
in its more abstract dimension, especially if compared with hard power. Moreover, Nye’s soft 
power is partly corresponding to Bacharach and Baratz second face of power. Based on the analysis 
of power carried out so far, it is possible to attempt an initial schematization (Figure 1) of the 
different dimensions (or faces) of power observed, that will be subsequently adapted to the more 
specific application of the concept of power to water relations.  
 
Figure 1: Schematic representation of the three dimensions of power (source: Author). 
 
As it was observed, defining power in politics can be challenging, as it is a concept that can be 
associated to different interpretations and meanings, based on different perspectives and 
epistemologies, and to this day, there is not a universally accepted definition of power. Jonathan 
Gaventa observed that “power is often assumed, rather than defined or addressed or used in a 
coherent manner” (Gaventa, 2003: 12). Nevertheless, for the purpose of this work, power needs to 
be somehow defined, or at least the definition needs to be narrowed from the many available in the 
literature. Without aspirations of being definitive or absolute, the following working definition 
serves to frame the concept of power within this research. Based on the assumption that power is 
indeed a multifaceted concept, power is here seen as the ability, or capacity, of one actor to get the 
desired outcome through coercive, bargaining and ideational/discursive means. These three aspects 
are intimately correlated and overlap with the Gramscian definition of hegemony based on force 
and consent, as it will be shown in the next paragraph. 
 
3. Hegemony 
The term hegemony (from Greek hēgemonia, “to lead”), defined by the Oxford English 
Dictionary as “leadership or dominance, especially by one state or social group over others”, 
originally indicated the predominance of a city state over another in ancient Greece. In modern 
times, however, the revamp and first modern definition of the term hegemony can be attributed to 
the Italian philosopher Vincenzo Gioberti, who defined it as “that sort of supremacy, pre-eminence, 
superiority, not legal nor juridical in the strict sense of the word, but morally efficient, that among 
several congeneric, unilingual and compatriot provinces, one exercises over the others” (Gioberti, 
1851, vol. II: 203). This definition became progressively popular and successfully penetrated the 
political language, with an increasing association of the term hegemony to the term leadership, 
notably as it was done by The Times in 1860 with reference to the Prussian hegemony/leadership 
over the German Confederation. In that occasion, the newspaper stated that “it is a glorious 
ambition which drives Prussia to assert her claim to the leadership, or as that land of professors 
phrases it, the “hegemony” of the Germanic Confederation” (The Times, 1860). This last point calls 
for a distinction between the orthodox realist usage of the term in IR – which refers to the 
dominance of one state over one or more other states through the exertion of the Weberian “power 
over” (Gill & Law, 1989: 476) – and the usage originating from the work of the Italian political 
theorist Antonio Gramsci.  
Gramsci developed the theory of hegemony in his monumental work Quaderni del carcere 
(Gramsci, 1975b), that he wrote between 1929 and 1935 while imprisoned by the Italian Fascist 
regime. The Gramscian concept of hegemony refers to the relations between classes and between 
the State and the civil society. In the struggle for hegemony in the civil society a political party, for 
instance, needs to get ideological and cultural consent. Once the consent from the civil society is 
obtained, the party can act as State and use its force to create a new historical bloc. Thus ideologies, 
for Gramsci, are assessed for their social effects rather than on their effective value (Fairclough, 
2010: 62). Hegemony denotes the success of a dominant class in presenting its view of the world 
and its ideology, in achieving an intellectual and moral leadership in a way that the other classes 
accept it and consider it common sense.  
As Ekers and Loftus noted, Gramsci's development of hegemony has two related facets. The first 
refers to “the maintenance of one social group's dominance over subordinate groups, accomplished 
through relations of consent and coercion” (Ekers & Loftus, 2008: 702). The second refers to how 
hegemony can be maintained, and this is done reproducing “the social relations that are 
foundational to a given social formation” (Ekers & Loftus, 2008: 702). More specifically, the State 
consolidates its hegemony and creates in people certain expectations and behaviours through a set 
of “private institutions” usually considered outside of the State, such as the Church, trade unions, 
schools and the intellectuals. The latters, are considered an efficacious instrument to affirm 
hegemony, such as the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, described by Gramsci as a “lay Pope” 
for his influence on Italian politics (Gramsci, 1975a: letter 210). If a government is not able to 
create its own class of intellectuals, it will only exercise dictatorship and not hegemony.  
Coercion and consent come together, and they are, in the function of hegemony, “connective” 
(Gramsci, 1975b: Q12§1). Although both force and consent are necessary for a hegemonic order to 
survive, it is primarily on consent that a State needs to base its relations with the civil society. It is 
based on these assumptions that Gramsci criticizes the Italian Fascist regime, which in his view 
represents an element of weakness of the bourgeoisie, as it is a regime based on force rather than on 
consent (Mordenti, 1996). Machiavelli’s image of the Prince, half beast (lion, fox and centaur) and 
half man – the metaphorical representation of a good ruler – is revisited by Gramsci as the 
combination of consent and coercion necessary to govern, “to the extent that the consensual aspect 
of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails” (Cox, 1983). To say it with the words of Gramsci, 
“the 'normal' exercise of hegemony […] is characterized by a combination of force and consent, 
which balance each other variously, in a way that force does not stand above consent, on the 
contrary, force should appear as if it is sustained by the consent of the majority” (Gramsci, 1975b: 
Q13§37, 1638). When the State dominates instead of directing, the result is dictatorship without 
hegemony (Gramsci, 1975b: Q15§59), or, in other words, domination and not hegemony.  
 
3.1. Hegemony applied to IR 
Now that the notion of hegemony has been outlined, it is possible to examine how this concept 
can be applied to IR. The notion of hegemony adopted in this study refers to the Gramscian notion 
of coercion and consent, which was originally conceived and applied at the State level (referring to 
“internal” hegemony in the era of Italian city-states or in Fascist Italy). In IR theory, two main 
approaches to hegemony can be identified: a conventional realist one and a critical neo-Gramscian 
perspective. As Bieler and Morton (2004: 87) observed, “conventional IR theory, reduces 
hegemony to a single dimension of dominance based on the economic and military capabilities of 
states”. This idea of hegemony – that can be linked to the first dimension of power, “hard power”, 
as it refers to domination through coercion – is at the origin of the hegemonic stability theory 
(HST), conceived by Robert Keohane (1984). HST is based on two central propositions: i) “Order 
in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power. Since regimes constitute elements 
of an international order, this implies that the formation of international regimes normally depends 
on hegemony”; ii) “The maintenance of order requires continuous hegemony” (Keohane, 1984: 31). 
Hence, according to Keohane, cooperation, order and stability can be achieved through the activities 
of a hegemonic power (as in the cases of the pax Britannica in the nineteenth century and the pax 
Americana after the Second World War), which “must possess enough military power to be able to 
protect the international political economy that it dominates from incursions by hostile adversaries” 
(Keohane, 1984: 39). 
In contrast with this approach, the neo-Gramscian perspective of hegemony developed by Robert 
Cox broadens the domain of hegemony going back to the Gramscian theorisations, and defines it as 
an expression of widely-based consent supported by material resources and institutions. As in the 
Gramscian thought, “dominance by a powerful state may be a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of hegemony” (Cox, 1981: 139). For Cox, hegemony is based on three spheres of activity: 
1) the social forces engendered by the production process; 2) the forms of state; 3) world orders 
(Cox, 1981: 137-8). In addition, within each sphere of activity Cox identified three categories of 
forces (or potentials) that interact: material capabilities/power (as industries and armaments), ideas 
(intersubjective meanings and collective images of social order held by different groups of people) 
and institutions (a particular amalgam of material power and ideas which help maintaining 
stability). These three forces act together in a reciprocal relationship to constitute an historical 
structure.  
In the world order, world hegemony is a “social structure, an economic structure, and a political 
structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three” (Cox, 1983: 172). 
Therefore, also when hegemony is studied at the world level, it appears as a complex of universal 
norms and institutions which create rules of behaviour for states and for the different forces 
operating within the civil society. The hegemon is the first amongst equals, as for example the 
United States at the UN General Assembly in comparison with Canada. Both countries have one 
vote and are formally on the same level, but the vote of the Unites States has a different weight in 
terms of influence than that of Canada (Zeitoun & Allan, 2008). This is the fundamental difference 
between hegemony and other forms of control such as imperialism or mere domination: hegemony 
can manipulate inter-state relations without a superior body, while, on the contrary, imperialism is 
based on formal rule and military imposition (Keohane, 1991). The key requirement for a 
hegemonic order to survive is that the hegemonised perceives the existing situation as right and 
proper. When consent vanishes and order starts being contested, as for instance in the case of the 
Arab states in 2011, there is not anymore hegemony and power can be toppled (Keucheyan, 2012). 
Further contributing to this neo-Gramscian perspective, the Belgian political theorist Chantal 
Mouffe (2008) conceived hegemony and a hegemonic order as something fixed through nodal 
points, “which discursively fix the meaning of institutions and social practices and articulate the 
‘common sense’ through which a given conception of reality is established” (Mouffe, 2008). 
Whether the notion of hegemony is approached from a realist or from a neo-Gramscian 
perspective, in both cases it is clear how this concept is intimately correlated to that of power (see 
Figure 2). The main difference is that for the former approach, the focus is on hard power, for the 
latter is on a combination of hard (coercion) and soft (consent) power. Considering hegemony only 
as a form of domination based on material capabilities seems somewhat reductive. On the subject of 
consent, in particular, it can be observed how, over the last five centuries, many thinkers have 
converged on one point: hard power alone is not enough to maintain supremacy.  
 
Figure 2: Schematic representation of the three dimensions of power overlapping with hegemony (source: 
Author). 
For Machiavelli, a Prince had to be respected to obtain obedience, and Gramsci, as it was widely 
observed, believed that force should appear as sustained by consent. Nye, similarly, understood the 
effects of soft power, intended as the power to persuade and to co-opt people rather than coerce 
them, as more effective than those of hard power: “if I can get you to want to do what I want, then I 
do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do” (Nye, 2002: 9). The reciprocal 
relationship between material capabilities, ideas and institutions devised by Cox, further confirms 
the idea of several forces acting together in a structure.  
Thus, there appears to be an intimate connection between material power and the invisible soft 
power of persuasion which is at the basis of the concept of hegemony. It can be argued, therefore, 
that with respect to hegemony power can be considered as the means to an end, with the end being 
the achievement and retention of hegemony. Power cannot be understood as the end itself (as for 
instance Machiavelli argued), as it is always wielded to get a desired outcome.  
 
3.2. The framework of hydro-hegemony 
Now that the key concepts of power and hegemony have been illustrated and connected, it is 
possible to briefly illustrate the subject of power and hegemony in water relations and the FHH. The 
first attempts to study how control of water resources is related to power dynamics and not to the 
idea of water-wars, can be traced back to Frederick Frey (1993), Peter Gleick (1993), and Miriam 
Lowi (1993). Among the four factors or characteristics that make water likely to be a source of 
strategic rivalry, Gleick identified “the relative power of the basin states” (Gleick, 1993: 84)2, using 
as an example the case of Turkey and its use of power for political goals in the Euphrates River 
basin, which the country shares with Syria and Iraq. Lowi (1993), adapted Keohane’s HST to the 
Jordan River basin and the dispute between Israel and Palestine, arguing that when the upstream 
riparian is also the hegemon (in her acceptation of the term, hegemon stands for the most powerful 
state in the basin), the chances that cooperation takes place are low since it has no interest or 
incentive in doing so; cooperation is more probable when the hegemon is located downstream and it 
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 The other three being the degree of scarcity, the extent to which the water supply is shared by more than one region or 
state and the ease of access to alternative fresh water sources (Gleick, 1993: 84). 
has a critical need of water
3
. The HST inspired also Frey, who was the first to present a power-
analytic framework. Frey reached the conclusion that the least stable situation in an international 
river basin is obtained when a powerful nation downstream is in need of water and compete for it 
with weaker nations upstream (Frey, 1993: 62).  
Frey’s work ignited the conception of the FHH, in which power relation are seen as a dynamic 
reality, since in international river basins “power and power asymmetry, are constantly being 
contested and challenged” (Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010: 30) in a quest to change the status-quo. As 
described by Zeitoun and Warner, the FHH is aimed at analysing hydropolitics avoiding the 
traditional “water wars” and “water peace” discourses (Warner & Zeitoun, 2008). Applying the 
Gramscian concept of hegemony and Lukes’s three dimension of power to hydropolitics, the FHH 
looks at how the basin state with more relative power, the hydro-hegemon (HH), “can establish the 
form of interation [sic] over transboundary waters that it prefers” (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 455). 
The FHH is the first structured study in the field of hydropolitics that takes power as a key to 
understand riparian relations, and this is where its importance resides.  
The FHH is based on three pillars, which are at the origin of power asymmetries in a river basin. 
The first and third pillars are respectively riparian position and exploitation potential, but the 
innovative contribution comes with the second pillar, which is the one centred on power. Lukes’s 
three dimensions of power are applied to hydropolitics to define respectively material, bargaining 
and ideational power. These forms of power act concurrently to determine who the hegemon is in 
an international river basin, or the HH. The HH is the basin riparian whose leadership is buttressed 
by authority, one that carries a hegemonic strategy based on cohesion and compliance and sustained 
by attraction rather than intimidation, although the two elements indeed coexist (Zeitoun & Allan 
                                                     
3
 Dinar et al. (2007: 150) efficiently contradicted Lowi’s argument taking as an example the Colorado River salinity 
issue between the United States and Mexico, where the former – being both the most powerful and the upstream state – 
not only entered into an agreement with Mexico but also paid the high costs of desalinating the waters flowing 
downstream. 
2008: 9). Force and consent, together with the imposition of ideas and dominant discourses, are 
more relevant in determining water use and allocation than other instruments such as international 
water law, water sharing ethics or riparian position (Zeitoun & Allan, 2008: 10).  
 
4. The FHH revisited 
The above discussion on power, hegemony and hydro-hegemony provides the elements to make 
an argument for a partial re-theorization of the FHH. The FHH offers extremely useful insights to 
the understanding of interstate relations, but does not explicitly shows that hegemony and not power 
is its central element. This is because its current structure based on pillars does not seem to be the 
most appropriate to represent the intimate connection that these two elements have. As it was 
widely observed, an analysis of power can benefit from the understanding that power is the means 
to hegemony, and not vice versa. 
As the focus is being placed on hegemony and on the ways in which it can be maintained or 
contested, why not placing hegemony at the centre of an analytical structure? Moreover, the pillars 
in the FHH have been used to give estimates of the various levels of power (see for instance Cascao 
& Zeitoun, 2010) in various river basins. While this can prompt interesting debates and gives an 
intuitive representation of who is considered the hydro-hegemon in a selected river basin, it can 
somehow be misleading, in the sense that it can lead to think that there is something that can be 
defined as “half-hegemony”. Furthermore, since each specific river basin has its own 
“problemshed”, the relative value of a certain form of power can change according to the basin and 
to the actors involved, and this cannot be shown in this schematic representation
4
.  
Therefore, I argue that representing power through pillars and measuring it, even if through 
estimates, does not really benefit the analysis of hegemony. I propose a redesign (see Figure 3) of 
the structure of hydro-hegemony, one that takes into consideration the forms of power in a similar 
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 This seems to recall Hoffmann’s (1972) conception of world politics in terms of distinct issue areas placed on 
alternative chessboards, each with a different weight. 
way than that adopted by the second pillar of the FHH, but that presents them as interconnected, 
since they are – to paraphrase Antonio Gramsci (1975b: Q12§1) – “connective” in the function of 
hegemony, or, in this case, of hydro-hegemony. 
 
Figure 3: The circle of hydro-hegemony (source: Author) 
 
The “circle of hydro-hegemony” embodies the theoretical rationale behind the schematic 
representation of the three dimensions of power overlapping with hegemony, as it was showed in 
Figure 2. It also takes inspiration from Cox’s concept of the relationship of forces in an historical 
structure (Cox, 1981), to display how the three forms of power interact and act together to constitute 
a hydro-hegemonic setting. While the circle of hydro-hegemony might primarily appear as a 
cosmetic change of the original FHH, it sets the basis for a different understanding of the complex 
relationship of forces in interstate relations.  
Hydro-hegemony is here defined as the success of a basin riparian in imposing a discourse, 
preserving its interests and impeding changes to a convenient status-quo. This definition combines 
elements from the conventional Gramscian definition of hegemony – which denotes the success of a 
dominant class in presenting its view of the world and its ideology – with aspects related to the 
management and control of shared water resources
5
.  
The three forms of power adopted in the circle of hydro-hegemony are not particularly different 
from those of the FHH. Material power include the riparian’s position, its size, military might, 
economic strength and structural capacities. The latter refer to the capacity of realising large 
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 It is worth mentioning that along with hegemony comes the possibility for counter-hegemony, and consequently for 
countering hydro-hegemony. In his seminal book Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance, James C. 
Scott (1985) observed how resistance forms a continuous, almost invisible flux, which can be difficult to be observed 
but also extremely powerful. As Laclau and Mouffe (2001) noted in their theoretical analysis of hegemony, micro-
strategies of resistance are always possible, even in the most totalising hegemonic setting.  
hydraulic infrastructures (such as dams) and to freely exploit those already existing. It is worth 
mentioning that the riparian’s position can significantly impact on material power and on the ability 
to exploit water resources. An example is that of a weaker upstream country that cannot exploit its 
hydroelectric potential, as Tajikistan in the Amu Darya river basin or Ethiopia in the Nile river 
basin. In this case, their relative material power is considerably lower than that of the downstream 
countries, Uzbekistan and Egypt, although the latter are geographically disadvantaged by their 
position (yet, Ethiopia has lately challenged this situation through the construction of the 
controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) (Gebreluel, 2014). This is because even if they 
are upstream, the status-quo is such that they cannot take advantage of their position, since the 
downstream countries successfully impede their hydraulic ambitions. Conversely, the relative 
material power of a hydro-hegemon in an upstream position, like Turkey in the Tigris-Euphrates 
river basin, is considerably higher than that of the downstream states, Iraq and Syria. 
Bargaining power relates to the ability to set a political agenda and to shift the balance in 
negotiations limiting the options and alternatives of the counterpart. Ideational (discursive) power 
refers to the ability to impose a sanctioned discourse or a particular ideology. While this last form of 
power appears indeed as the most effective of the three towards the achievement of hydro-
hegemony, the relative value of each of the three forms of power can vary depending on the 
situation in which the basin riparians find themselves. Accordingly, rather than measuring the 
relative weight of each form of power, what seems analytically relevant is to observe which forms 
of power are more used by each riparian, and trying to understand the reasons behind such choice.  
 
5. Applying the CHH to the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia 
The following briefly discusses transboundary water politics in the Aral Sea basin in Central 
Asia, using the CHH as analytical framework for understanding how various forms of power are 
connective in the function of hegemony. The Aral Sea basin denotes a competitive hydro-
hegemonic setting, marked by a contested control of water resources and a dominative form of 
hydro-hegemony exerted by Uzbekistan, that given its water allocation, the total population and the 
irrigated area of the basin states can be considered the hydro-hegemon (Wegerich, 2008; Menga, 
2014; Shalpykova, 2014). In a competitive hydro-hegemonic setting, disputants consider the 
resources under negotiations as limited, and parties take a position and seek power and control 
(Jarvis & Wolf, 2010: 129). While this hydro-hegemony might be not particularly clear in absolute 
terms (Bernauer & Siegfried, 2012), or in comparison with other river basins where the hydro-
hegemon appears stronger (e.g. Turkey in the Tigris-Euphrates basin), it is nevertheless rather 
evident in relation to the two upstream countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, that also happen to be 
the poorer and less developed among the five Central Asian countries. At the regional level, 
Uzbekistan has been by far the most vocal opponent of the construction of large hydroelectric plants 
upstream, and has so far managed to impede or slow down their realisation. Uzbekistan has also 
maintained the consolidated control it has over water resources, keeping unchanged its 
advantageous water allocation after the collapse of the Soviet Union by signing the Almaty 
Agreement in 1992, thus continuing to practice the water-intensive cotton monoculture whose 
income is needed by the Uzbek political elites to support the existing system of social, political, and 
economic control (Weinthal, 2006). Additionally, since both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan depend 
from Uzbekistan for their imports of natural gas, Tashkent uses the situation to gain leverage on the 
countries, imposing high purchase prices and uncompromising payment deadlines, and frequently 
cutting gas supplies, causing serious energy crises (see for instance BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2012 and 2013). 
Over the last two decades, the incompatibility between water demands of irrigation and 
hydropower gave rise to a tense confrontation amid the upstream and downstream republics on the 
use and control of the region’s water resources. The Uzbek President Islam Karimov, in particular, 
perceives the development of hydraulic infrastructures upstream as an existential threat to the well-
being of his country, and opposes these projects vehemently. In this context, Tajikistan’s and 
Kyrgyzstan’s flagship water resources development projects, the Rogun and Kambarata dams, have 
crystallised the upstream-downstream tensions over the differing preference of water use. Their 
construction could entail an irreversible change in the status-quo that the Uzbek government wants 
to maintain unchanged.  
Although the two projects are not identical, their many points in common and the nature of the 
threat perceived led the Government of Uzbekistan (GoU) to treat them as a single entity. The 
Uzbek counter-arguments concerning their realisation are essentially three. First, due to the 
seismicity of the area where they are located, the likely event of a major earthquake could lead to 
one of the worst man-made catastrophes in history (Karimov, 2010). Second, during the time 
necessary to fill the two water reservoirs there will be a reduction in the amount of water flowing to 
Uzbekistan (Interfax News Agency, 2010; Karimov, 2010). Third, the impact of these two outdated 
Soviet projects should be assessed by means of an “impartial expertise made by international 
experts under auspices of the United Nations” (Norov, 2009: 2). These are the three contentions 
forming the Uzbek discourse, that is projected both at the international and domestic level and is 
disseminated through speeches at international forums, the active criticism of the dams in various 
settings and the engagement of regional heavyweights such as Russia or Kazakhstan (Menga, 
2014).  
Based on this brief overview, it is now possible to illustrate the Uzbek hegemonic strategy using 
the CHH, as shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Wielding power: the five tactics forming the Uzbek hegemonic strategy in the Aral Sea basin in the 
period 1991-2013 (source: Author).  
 
In the period 1991-2013, the Uzbek hegemonic strategy involved the deployment of ideational, 
bargaining and material power through five main tactics: i) international support
6
; ii) knowledge 
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 This is done mostly by constantly raising water and hydroelectric issues in the speeches that the Uzbek governments 
delivers at the UN General Assembly and at other international forums (see for instance Norov, 2009; Karimov, 2010; 
Ganiev, 2011; Kamilov, 2012). 
construction
7
; iii) recourse to international law
8
; iv) active stalling
9
; and v) resource capture
10
. The 
basic goal here is to maintain the status-quo unchanged. This implies the avoidance of changes in 
water allocation or in the way water is used and shared. While the Uzbek government can do little 
to control events such as population growth and climate change that might sooner or later impact on 
the Central Asian rivers and consequently affect the status-quo, some other events such as the 
construction of large dams can be more easily controlled or contested. 
The Uzbek government has therefore used all of the three forms of power to maintain its 
hegemony and to reassert and consolidate its interests while eroding those of the hegemonised. 
Uzbekistan used its material (or hard) and soft power to respectively coerce and persuade other 
actors and get the desired outcome. Yet, hard power never implied the use of violence (although this 
was sometimes used as a threat), but rather the recourse to other “structural” measures such as the 
construction of water reservoirs or actively stalling the provision of construction materials. 
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 Implemented through the construction and dissemination of a science-based knowledge that warns about the 
catastrophic effects of large hydroelectric dams (among others, The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan 2010 and 
2011; Pravda Vostoka, 2011).  
8
 Starting in 2007, when it ratified both the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes and the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, the Uzbek government has actively advocated for the respect of the key principles of 
international water law, notably equitable and reasonable utilization, prior notification, causing no significant harm and 
consultation between basin riparians (among others, Norov, 2007; Karimov, 2010). 
9
 For what concerns the Rogun Dam, since all of Tajikistan’s rail imports have to pass through Uzbekistan, starting in 
2010 the Uzbek authorities have delayed thousands of rail carriages bound to the Rogun construction site that were 
crossing its border (Eurasianet, 2010). Furthermore, in 2012 Uzbekistan dismantled one of the three major rail links to 
Tajikistan, making the movement of trains impossible (BBC Summary, 2012). 
10
 Over the last few years the GoU has built a number of reservoirs using winter releases of water from the Toktogul 
Reservoir with the plan of using it for irrigation in summer, becoming less dependent on Kyrgyzstan’s water (Wegerich, 
2008). Uzbekistan built these reservoirs without notifying or consulting with Kyrgyzstan, the country whose interests 
could be potentially harmed by such initiative (Kemelova & Zhalkubaev, 2003). 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has developed an analytical model that connects the concepts of power and hegemony 
to revisit the FHH, proposing a redesign of its structure named the “circle of hydro-hegemony”. 
Hegemony is placed at the centre of this analytical structure, while the various forms of power 
appear as an interconnected entity that is connective in the function of hydro-hegemony. The results 
of this analysis suggest that among the three forms of power, the ideational one seems to be the 
most significant to both maintain and contest hegemony. Going back to Gramsci’s (1975a and 
1975b) idea of an “intellectual” hegemony, and more in general to the power theory review carried 
out above, the ability to impose ideas and influence those of the others is considered an efficacious 
instrument to affirm hegemony. However, while on the one hand the political setting described by 
Gramsci featured a lay Pope, Benedetto Croce, which acted as a key instrument of hegemony, on 
the other hand, Central Asian water politics do not seem to be influenced by a singular actor but 
rather by a multiplicity of fragmented realities. This is perhaps the reason behind the strong 
influence that the Soviet Union and its policies still have on water management issues in Central 
Asia. Uzbekistan’s water hegemony is primarily a result of the decisions taken in the Soviet period, 
and of the succeeding ability of the Uzbek government to maintain the status-quo unchanged.  
The in-depth interdisciplinary theoretical discussion behind the CHH can enhance our 
understanding of the relationship and interconnections between the notions of power and 
hegemony, providing insights and a new analytical approach to studying power in critical 
hydropolitics. Yet, such a focus on theory, rather than on empirical material, also represents a 
limitation of this study. Further research should focus on the practical application of the CHH to 
international river basins, to explore the different tactics used by basin riparians to wield power and 
to better understand how the various forms of power act together in maintaining hegemony. From 
an analytical point of view, the CHH might also benefit from unpacking riparian position, currently 
subsumed under material power, to better assess a riparian’s ability to exploit water resources. 
Likewise, since hegemony stems from a combination of hard and soft power, Nye’s notion of smart 
power could be further elaborated to understand its application to transboundary water politics. 
The study of counter hydro-hegemony also appears as another area that needs further work. The 
CHH could be employed to examine the continuous process through which a hegemonised basin 
riparian attempts to challenge and contest a disadvantageous status-quo. In this regard, it would be 
interesting to compare counter-hegemonic tactics in a number of international river basins, to 
explore which forms of power are used by different riparians and why and how these differ from 
those employed by hydro-hegemons. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in 
the Nile river basin could be for instance compared with the construction of the Rogun Dam in 
Tajikistan, as in both cases power relationships are being challenged by hegemonised basin 
riparians. This might apply to the issue of large dams, as it was done in this paper, but also to any 
other activity aimed at countering an existing hegemonic order. 
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